Bail Out Monday
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Another day, another bail out.
The Bank of England has finally released plans to swap government bonds for mortgage-backed securities, with the avowed aim of freeing up the UK home loan scene.
So many issues are raised by this latest case of government market involvement, it's hard to know what to address first.
Will it help mortgage lending recover?
Is it fraught with ‘moral hazard' (rewarding bank failings)?
Will it do any good, or even more harm than good?
But before trying to answer any of these, first let's look at the facts. Probably best, then, to start with the official statement.
The Bank kicks off by asserting that financial markets aren't working "normally" because of a US-initiated lack of confidence in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), particularly in the subprime area.
Leaving aside for a moment what constitutes ‘normality' - I would contend that the lending laxity of the last few years has been little short of insanity - what the Bank delicately describes as an MBS "illiquidity overhang" has made people very jittery.
In other words, the cash has dried up. Banks can neither sell their MBS holdings nor borrow against them. Hence 3-month LIBOR (the London interbank offered rate at which banks lend to each other) rising to nearly 1% more than official base rates.
But don't fret, says the Bank, nothing's gone wrong with these loans. It's just that the balance sheets of poor old British banks have got somewhat over-stretched, creating uncertainty and chopping back on their willingness to lend to you and me.
And now it appears that the "problems" won't go away and a "return to normal" isn't on the immediate horizon. No surprise to me, but perhaps I've rather more faith than the Bank in the market's ability to suss out how dodgy this debt really is.
So here's the Bank's answer to sorting out the ‘overhang'.
Not content with pumping ever more money into the system - since August, the Bank of England has upped the amount of central bank cash available to financial institutions by 42% - the thinkers of Threedneedle Street have gone a stage further.
The latest idea is the Special Liquidity Scheme which lets banks and building societies swap up to £50bn (or maybe £100bn?) of their illiquid assets for liquid Treasury Bills for up to three years.
Commercial banks will then be able to borrow against these Treasury Bills and...Hey Presto!...problem solved. Loads of largesse will now be sloshing round the bankers' parlours, just waiting for us to wander in and sign up for a loan. Meanwhile, the long-suffering taxpayer, as ever, picks up the tab if the assets the Bank has swapped go pear-shaped.
Actually, that's not quite true. In my rant I'm in danger of getting carried away.
In fairness, the Scheme should protect the public purse. In theory, banks will be stumping up much more valuable assets than the Treasury Bills they get from the Bank. If those assets depreciate in value, more will have to be put up or some of the Treasury Bills will have to go back. So it's not quite a free lunch. Unless the banks manage to con the ‘Old Lady' with what they swap.
But back to my three questions:
Mortgage volumes? I don't see these recovering much. Lenders will just say thanks to the Bank for bailing them out...but will carry on cleaning up their loan books as before. In short, unless you're a ‘prime' borrower, don't expect a better mortgage deal.
Moral hazard? Yes, without a doubt. Governments don't exist to bail out imprudent bankers (or borrowers). Anyway, why should British taxpayers' money be put at risk (yet again?)
More harm than good? Just because the Americans have tried this doesn't mean it's a good idea. Government distortion of market pricing is almost always bad news. This is no exception.